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µ7KH\FDQ¶WEHWKHEXIIHUDQ\ORQJHU¶)URQW-line managers and class relations under 
white-collar lean production 
 
This article reasserts the value of the examination of class relations. It does so via a case 
study of tax-processing sites within HM Revenue and Customs, focusing on the changes 
wrought by the alterations to labour and supervisory processes implemented under the banner 
RIµOHDQSURGXFWLRQ¶,WFRQFHQWUDWHVon the transformation of front-line managers, as their 
tasks moved from those that required tax knowledge and team support to those that narrowed 
their work towards output monitoring and employee supervision. Following Carchedi, these 
changes are conceptualised as strengthening the function of capital performed by managers, 
and weakening their role within the labour process. 
 
Keywords 
Front-line managers, HMRC, labour process, class relations, lean 
 
Introduction 
 
The 1970s produced a significant debate within sociology on the rise of a new middle class 
that, unlike the middle class of independent producers and the self-employed, was intimately 
connected to developments within capitalist labour processes. Within the debate, Poulantzas 
(1975) and Carchedi (1977) emphasised the specific social relations of those who, while not 
owning the means of production, carry out functions on behalf of capital. Braverman (1974) 
was also central to the debate, as his contribution to labour process analysis centred on the 
increased division of labour and the creation of new roles to superintend the performance of 
UHFRQILJXUHGODERXUDVZRUNHUV¶NQRZOHGJHZDVSURJUHVVLYHO\ captured, codified and 
desublimated into the growing hierarchies of control. These hierarchies resulted in the 
increased division of managerial work and the diminution of the hitherto extensive power of 
front-line managers (FLMs), as managerial hierarchies became staffed increasingly by 
graduate intakes (Child and Partridge 1982). So powerful was this tendency that in a number 
of accounts, managerial and supervisory employees were characterised as being 
SUROHWDULDQLVHGDVWKH\H[SHULHQFHGµJUHDWHULQVHFXULW\ stress, and decline in pay relative to 
VHQLRUPDQDJHPHQW¶6FDUERURXJKDQG%XUUHOO. 1996: 185), and were conceptualised as wage 
labour and members of the working class (Meiksins 1986; Smith and Thompson 1999). 
 
Today, theories focusing on the centrality of workplace relations in the generation of class 
relations have all but disappeared (Atkinson 2009), overshadowed firstly by what Crompton 
WHUPHGWKHµHPSOR\PHQWDJJUHJDWH¶DSSURDFKWRFODVV¶DVVRFLDWHGZLWK Goldthorpe 
(1980) and Erik Olin Wright (1997), and secondly by more cultural analyses influenced by 
%RXUGLHX¶VHPSKDVLVRQFXOWXUDODQGVRFLDODVRSSRVHGWRHFRQRPLF capital (Savage 
2000; Skeggs 1997; Hebson 2009). Where there is contemporary concern with groups at 
ZRUNWKDWPLJKWEHVWLOOWHUPHGµQHZPLGGOHFODVV¶H[FHVVLYH weight rests on subjectivity and 
the ontological insecurity of managers, (see, for instance, Thomas and Linstead 2002; 
Willmott 1997). Even theorists who continue to acknowledge their debt to Braverman now 
eschew the connection between class and the labour process as crude and unhelpful (Hassard 
et al. 2009). The legacies of Carchedi and Poulantzas fare no better, with Smith and 
Thompson (1999: 219) dismissing them as EHLQJFRQFHUQHGZLWKµWKHYHU\VWHULOH
functionalist project of manufacturing classes out RIWKHWHFKQLFDOGLYLVLRQRIODERU¶,QGHHG
all theories relating labour process perspectives to class analysis are rejected in toto, as 
µDWWHPSWV«WRUHFRQQHFWWKHDQDO\VLVWRFODVV WKHRU\«DUHIODZHGHQWHUSULVHV¶ 
This paper takes issue with these conclusions to return to social class and the workplace, 
not in terms of a long British tradition of determining class through subjective self-
classification (see Nichols 1979 for an effective critique of this approach, and Marks and 
Baldry 2009 for its continuation), but rather utilising much ignored Carchedian perspectives 
on the class relations entered into during production. Of course, class relations in capitalist 
VRFLHWLHVDUHPDQLIHVWHGEH\RQGSURGXFWLRQ,QGHHG0DU[¶VGHWDLOHG examination of class 
ZLWKLQWKHSURGXFWLRQSURFHVVZDVHQWLWOHGµ5HVXOWVRIWKH,PPHGLDWH 3URGXFWLRQ3URFHVV¶
(Marx 1976). That class relations were not restricted to this sphere was indicated both by his 
VWUHVVRQWKHµLPPHGLDWH¶DQGWKURXJKRWKHUZRUNVVXFKDV Class Struggles in France (2007). 
Nevertheless, despite this qualification, focus on relations LQµWKHKLGGHQDERGHRISURGXFWLRQ¶
(Marx 1976: 279-80), with an attendant concentration on ownership, control, and the 
production of surplus, was central; and now, as then, these relations are frequently ignored or 
obscured. 
 
This article examines the changing class relations reflected in, and mediated by, the roles 
played by front-OLQHPDQDJHUVKHUHDIWHU)/0VLQ+HU0DMHVW\¶V5HYHQXHDQG Customs 
(HMRC). The object of the research is significant for its size. HMRC employed over 90,000 
workers when it was established in 2005 by the merger of Customs and Excise and the Inland 
Revenue, a figure that had been reduced to 67,000 by 2010. The department is responsible for 
the administration and collection of taxes, ranging from income to corporation tax and 
National Insurance contributions, as well as the distribution of Child Trust Funds and the 
payment of Tax Credits. The progressive implementation of changes in workplace 
organisation took place from 2005 onwards under the rubric RIOHDQSURGXFWLRQRUµ/HDQ¶DV
it is became known), which was a purported means by which services could be maintained 
and improved despite the reduction in headcount. The changes comprised the adoption of 
classic Taylorist work-study techniques, task fragmentation, ICT-enabled changes in flow, 
standard operating procedures, and arbitrary hourly targets. Documenting these changes 
extends our knowledge of lean production to white-collar work, thereby adding to accounts of 
the intensification of work in the automotive industry (Stewart et al. 2009), as well as to 
earlier studies highlighting the impact of lean production on the health and safety of workers 
(Lewchuk and Robertson 1997). 
 
Elsewhere, closer parallels are drawn to these works, dealing with the degradation of work, 
the relationship of Lean to new public management, the impact RQZRUNHUV¶KHDOWKDQG safety 
and industrial relations, and the performance of the trade union (Carter et al. 2011a; 2011b 
and 2013a; 2012 and 2013b). The primary focus here is on the exercise of authoritarian 
management and the neglected area of class relations. The purpose, therefore, is not to 
engage with the extent to which the model of Lean XWLOLVHGLVDµSXUH¶RUFRKHUHQWRQH,Q
their evaluation, hired consultants expressed reservations DERXWWKHH[WHQWRI+05&¶V
success in becoming Lean, albeit notLQJWKDWLWµLV PRYLQJLQWKHULJKWGLUHFWLRQ¶5DGQRUDQG
Bucci 2007:7), but more pertinently, all implementations inevitably depart from Womack et 
DO¶VRULJLQDOPRGHO'DQIRUG and even subsequent work by Womack and Jones (2003) 
has a different emphasis. What LVLPSRUWDQWKHUHLVWKHIDFWWKDWWKHXVHRIWKHWHUPµ/HDQ¶
was synonymous in HMRC with changes sought by a management committed to a new 
regime that has been promoted as an exemplar for the rest of the Civil Service and beyond 
(Radnor and Boaden 2008). The term is retained as a shorthand for these changes. 
 
The analysis of workplace changes is foregrounded by a brief examination of the classic 
writings on class and supervision, and the ways in which developments in the organisation 
and supervision of white-collar labour have impacted on the balance between the roles of 
coordination and control traditionally performed by FLMs. The HMRC case study describes 
contested changes that have increased control, intensified white-collar work and altered the 
EDODQFHRIWDVNVZLWKLQPDQDJHUV¶ZRUN)LQDOO\WKHSDSHUDVVHVVHV the implications of 
FKDQJLQJUROHVIRUPDQDJHUV¶XQLRQPHPEHUVKLSDQGFODVVUHODWLRQV 
 
Class, management and supervision 
 
Accounts frequently attribute to Marx a binary class structure under capitalism comprising 
a bourgeoisie and a proletariat based on ownership of the means of production and the need 
to sell labour power, respectively (Carter 1985). The resurgence of interest in 0DU[¶VZRUNLQ
the 1970s attempted to dismantle this orthodox view. While the growth of capitalist 
production eliminated many petty bourgeois, small-scale and independent producers, and thus 
supported the idea of proletarianisation and a polarised class structure, new studies directed 
attention to the simultaneous growth of a new middle class configured within large-scale 
capitalist enterprises. There were sharp disagreements about the exact basis of, and 
appropriate terminology for, this phenomenon, but there was agreement that the class 
structure was far from a simple dichotomy. Although the analysis of Poulantzas (1975) 
gained far more prominence, the work of Carchedi (1977) was arguably more consistent with 
0DU[¶VWKHRU\VHH:ULJKWIRUDQHIIHFWLYHFULWLTXH of Poulantzas). Carchedi pointed to 
the consequences for class relations as enterprises grew: ownership became dispersed through 
joint-VWRFNFRPSDQLHVDQGRZQHUV¶ involvement in management and production ceased, 
replaced progressively by managerial hierarchies. 
 
Management of capitalist enterprises had always possessed dual functions of control and 
supervision, on the one hand, and coordination and unification of the production process, on 
the other (Marx 1991: 510). While the former tasks arose specifically because of the 
antagonistic relations of production, due to the complexity of production, the latter would be 
necessary under any socialised system, while coordinating and unifying production managers 
were part of the collective worker. It followed that the supervision and control necessary for 
FDSLWDOLVPLQ&DUFKHGL¶VWHUPWKHµJOREDOIXQFWLRQ RIFDSLWDO¶DGGHGQRWKLQJWRWKHXVHYDOXH
of products, and were not part of a labour process. Marx described the costs of these tasks as 
µfaux frais de production¶ (incidental costs) (Marx 1976: 446). In contrast, coordinating and 
unifying tasks were part of the labour process paid from variable capital. Much of the 
discussion on white-collar and state labour has revolved around the significance of the 
categories productive and unproductive ODERXUWKHSDUWLFXODUVLJQLILFDQFHRI&DUFKHGL¶V
contribution was his attempt to re-draw the contours of this debate by insisting that the tasks 
of supervision and control, however necessary under capitalism, were neither productive nor 
unproductive labour, but were non-labour. With this analysis, Carchedi maintained that it 
was possible to distinguish a new middle class that did not own the means of production, but 
carried out, though not necessarily exclusively, those functions associated with the global 
function of capital. 
 
These differences in perspectives on class were mirrored within the analysis of state 
employment. Some writers treated the vast majority of state employees as productive workers 
(Cockburn 1977; Gough 1975). In contrast, Poulantzas (1978) maintained that all state 
employees outside certain nationalised industries and transport were either bourgeois or petty 
bourgeois. In the context of the Civil Service in general, and HMRC in particular, all site-
level employees would therefore be petty bourgeois. FLMs and the people they supervise 
alike would be given no noticeably significant distinguishing social functions or separate 
interests. Observed conflict and antagonism would have no social VWUXFWXUDOEDVLV&DUFKHGL¶V
position allowed for mRUHGLVWLQFWLRQVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK0DU[¶V analysis. Just as the social 
relations of individual firms involve unifying and coordinating roles, so does any complex 
society need roles that ensure social reproduction and the generation, coordination and 
transmission of socially useful knowledge. Such work is part of a labour process, and as such, 
those performing it are part of the working class. 
 
However, just as the capitalist company is exploitative and requires the management of the 
supervision of wage labour, the capitalist state is oppressive, with a need for ideologists and a 
repressive apparatus. Those performing these tasks are not part of the labour process, and not 
members of the collective worker (Carter 1995). 
 
These perspectives inform the approach here. However, while FLMs are viewed as part of the 
management hierarchy and can be characterised as new middle class, their actual day-to-day 
relations and the nature of their social functions are complex, and thus no theoretical schema 
can substitute for an examination of their actual and varied relations. Contrary to Smith and 
Thompson, starting from an analysis of the structural bases of class does not necessarily 
HQWDLOSHUVSHFWLYHVRQVRFLDOFODVVHVWKDWGLVSOD\µDQ aversion to empirical work and a 
WHQGHQF\WRFUHDWHFODVVHVDOIUHVFR¶6PLWKDQG Thompson 1999: 219). 
 
Changing relations in white-collar work 
 
Sociological work on supervisors tends to focus on those overseeing manual labour 
processes. While post-Second World War accounts characterised FLMs as being caught 
between the competing social forces of capital and labour (Roethlisberger 1945, Wray 1949), 
later ones charted the long-term decline of their power as managerial hierarchies grew 
(Nelson 1975). As Rose et al. (1987: 8) show, the claiPWKDWµVXSHUYLVRUVDUHSURJUHVVLYHO\ 
EHLQJGHQXGHGRIWKHLUSRZHUVDQGIXQFWLRQVZLWKLQLQGXVWU\¶ZDVFRPPRQWR studies from 
very different political perspectives. Post-industrial theorists saw the rise of newly skilled 
categories of labour, frequently organised in teams, rendering supervisors largely redundant. 
Theorists from a Marxist perspective, arguing the tendency of capitalism to deskill workers, 
envisaged a different path: simplified work could be controlled by technical or bureaucratic 
organisational means (Edwards 1979), thus emptying supervision of authority and discretion. 
This process, according to Braverman, was accompanied E\µPXOWLSO\LQJUDQNVRI
VXSHUYLVRUVIRUHPHQDQGSHWW\PDQDJHUV¶ 
 
Evaluating these positions, Rose et al. (1987) acknowledged that while foremen and 
LQVSHFWRUV¶SRZHUVRIVDQFWLRQRQVXERUGLQDWHVDIIHFWLQJSURPRWLRQSURVSHFWVVXVSHQVLRQ or 
discipline) had declined, they were still involved in task allocation and decisionsabout the 
pace and intensity of workOHDGLQJWRWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWµLQGHSHQGHQW direct and 
authoritative supervision is still a significant element in the apparatus of social control at the 
SRLQWRISURGXFWLRQ¶'HVSLWHWKHFRQILGHQFHZLWKZKLFKWKLV contention was made, 
it was likely unfounded, not least because it ignored the long-term ZHDNHQLQJRIVXSHUYLVRUV¶
functions (Ray 1989: 68), a weakening further displayed in the case study examined here. 
There is no a priori reason to suppose that these developments should be paralleled in white-
collar areas. Nevertheless, there is a long tradition of recognising that the class position of 
routine white-collar employees is often little different from that of manual workers 
(Crompton and Jones 1984; Baldry et al. 2007), and much contemporary work emphases the 
convergence of deteriorating conditions, even to the extent of claiming WKDWµWKHEXUGHQRI
change has fallen increasingly on a hitherto rather better protected and better rewarded group 
of people ± salaried white-collar middle mDQDJHUV¶+DVVDUG et al. 2009: 5). Major changes 
within white-collar work have been driven by increased competition, government cuts and 
rationalisation, and the adoption of ICT innovations. 
 
Unsurprisingly, ICT impacts on the social organisation of production, with Hassard et al. 
FODLPLQJWKDWLWµKDVVHHPLQJO\HOLPLQDWHGWKHQHHGIRUPDQ\RIWKHWUDGLWLRQDO roles 
of middle managers, such as monitoring front-line employees and conducting horizontal and 
YHUWLFDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶$FFRUGLQJO\WKRXVDnds of middle-manager jobs have been 
HOLPLQDWHGZKLOHWKHUROHVRIWKRVHUHPDLQLQJµKDYH LQFUHDVHGPDVVLYHO\LQVFRSHDQGVFDOH¶
(2009: 6). Moreover, they are just as subject to control from above as other employees, with 
control embedded in targets and the requirement to collect and collate statistics that 
simultaneously monitor and expose PDQDJHUV¶RZQSHUIRUPDQFH1LFKROVDQG%H\QRQ
Boreham et al. 2008). 
 
The evolution of white-collar work organisation has impacted on the role of supervision. 
Before the advent of call centres in the utilities sector, for instance, supervisors SOD\HGµD
PLQRUUROHLQPDQDJLQJDQLQGLYLGXDOFOHUN¶VZRUNORDGDFWLQJPRUHDVWHFKQLFDO experts, 
often undertaking clerical duties that required authorisation of expenses, or the allocation of 
DOORZDQFHVWRFXVWRPHUDFFRXQWV¶(OOLVDQG7D\ORU8VLQJ &DUFKHGL¶V
perspectives, supervisors had at this point a significant role within the labour process, but that 
role has been weakening as the demands for greater supervision and control of labour 
escalate. The imposition of quantitative targets and performance management particularly 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKFDOOFHQWUHVDQGWKHLULQWHJUDWLRQRIµDGYDQFHG telephony with various 
FRPSXWHUWHFKQRORJLHV¶7D\ORUDQG%DLQSURYLded the means for linking corporate 
strategy and workplace productivity, tying supervisors more closely to value extraction and 
transforming workplace relations, as both managers and workers were constrained by the new 
GHPDQGV%DOGU\HWDO¶VVWXG\ of the intensification of white-collar work in large 
private and public-sector offices (1998: 174) stresses, alongside electronic surveillance, the 
importance of the physical reorganisation RIWKHZRUNSODFHµWKHPRGHUQRIILFHLV
characterized by cellular or team forms of organization in which supervision or team leaders, 
or other HRM equivalents, perform the role RIFRQWLQXRXVYLVXDOVXUYHLOODQFH¶,WLVQRWFOHDU
from this account the extent to which managers continued to engage in labour-process 
activities. Team leaders in the private sector office studied certainly did retain a role, and the 
absence of team leaders in the public-sector offices suggests residual retention of line-
management roles in advising and supporting workers on labour-process issues. The decline 
in this latter aspect in HMRC is significant, and is traced below through an examination of 
the way changes in HMRC WUDQVIRUPHGPDQDJHUV¶UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVIURPWKRVHFRQFHUQHG
with supporting employees and production to new responsibilities emphasising control and 
supervision, thus providing the focus for an examination of changing class relations. 
 
Methodology 
 
The research is concerned with changes in class relations in contemporary white-collar 
employment. The Civil Service in general, and HMRC in particular, is an appropriate site for 
such research, since the department has a large number of highly concentrated white-collar 
service employees, and was subject to a process of reorganisation that allowed an evaluation 
of the social effects of changes to the labour process, supervision and control. The research 
ZDVSDUWLFXODUO\SHUWLQHQWVLQFH+05&HPSOR\HHV¶H[SHULHQFHVRI working under the new 
conditions were intended to be prototypical for significant areas of the Civil Service. The 
results are based on work carried out in 2008-11 at six large processing sites of HMRC that 
ZHUHVXEMHFWWRWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHµ/HDQ¶SDFNDJH 
A mix of qualitative and quantitative data was collected. Trade union representatives were 
interviewed at all sites. Consistent with the approach to class analysis adopted, there were no 
direct questions on class affiliation, but detailed accounts were solicited on changes in work 
content and authority relations. The interviews, together with additional ones with 
administrative grades, revealed a concern with the changing nature of management, and, in 
response, interviews were extended to supervisory grades (FLMs) at four sites. In total, 36 
staff were initially interviewed. The interviews guided the construction of an 11-page survey, 
focusing on levels of consultation with staff; job discretion; the impact of teamworking; work 
intensity; quality; job satisfaction; sickness, ill-KHDOWKDQGDEVHQFHPDQDJHUV¶YLHZVDQG
union effectiveness at local and national levels. 
 
Standard Likert-scale questions supplemented others derived from white-collar work studies 
and concerns raised in exploratory interviews. The questions were formatted so that in order 
to be consistent, both positive and negative responses to statements had to be selected. 
Extended comments were also invited. The questionnaire was piloted and amended before 
distribution in 2008 to approximately 15 per cent of the workforce at each site. In total, 1650 
questionnaires were distributed, and 840 (51 per cent) returned. Of the returns, 125 (15 per 
cent) were from administrative assistants (AAs), 627 (75 per cent) from administrative 
officers (AOs) and 83 (10 per cent) from FLMs. These returns, and the initial and 
supplementary interviews with and about line management, form the evidence base for the 
arguments developed. All interviews and their locations remain anonymous in order to ensure 
that individuals cannot be identified. 
 
The research methods used here are underpinned by retrospective accounts of the situation in 
HMRC before the introduction of Lean. There are dangers that staff views are coloured by 
YLHZVRIDµJROGHQSDVW¶+RZHYHUWKHFKDQJHVZHUHVWLOOUHFHQWDQGRQJRLQJ when the 
research was undertaken. Moreover, HMRC staff surveys taken year-on-year themselves 
indicate developing discontent, as staff considered the deteriorating quality of working life. 
To take just one example amongst many, in response to the question µ,ZRXOGUHFRPPHQGWKH
'HSDUWPHQWDVDJRRGSODFHWRZRUN¶LQSHUFHntof respondents agreed and 46 per 
cent disagreed (HMRC 2006). By 2010, the respective figures were 10 per cent and 63 per 
cent (HMRC 2010). The responses in our research are subjective, but they are rich in the 
detail of change, as well as of attached emotion. Moreover, as Gabriel (1993) points out, it is 
the conditions of the present that produce nostalgia, and it is these conditions that are the 
focus. 
 
The transformation of front-line managers in HMRC 
 
Before successive reforms started by the 1997 Conservative government, proactive line 
management was not a prominent feature of Civil Service work (Carter and Fairbrother 
7KHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIµDJHQFLHV¶)DLUEURWKHUDLPHGWREUHDN-up a uniform, 
centralised Civil Service and its accompanying common conditions of service. In the process, 
bureaucratic relations were fractured, clearer managerial relations and responsibilities 
promoted, and private-sector management techniques introduced. Within the DJHQFLHVµQHZ
SXEOLFPDQDJHPHQW¶FHQWUDOLVHd policy-making while at the same time decentralising 
accountability for the attainment of targets (Pollitt 1990). The Gershon Report (2004) 
highlighted economies to be achieved by the rationalisation of staffing, closure and 
concentration of operating sites, and the simplification of processes. A reduced workforce, 
concentrated into large processing sites using standardised operations, would, it was hoped, 
produce efficiency savings and raise service levels. These developments would build upon 
the growth of contact (call) centres in the Civil Service to make organisations more efficient 
by separating routine enquiries from processing (Fisher 2004). 
 
The subsequent introduction of Lean from 2005 into HMRC, alongside ICT developments, 
was part of a long process of reformulating both accountability and the nature of work, 
moving HMRC closer to a culture of command and control. Changing the social relations 
with subordinates and thereby the class practices of FLMs was critical in ensuring that they 
articulated more clearly the perceived interests of the state as employer, as specified by 
Gershon. The corollary of this movement, the elimination of elements ofFLM roles that could 
be conceived as being part of the labour process, was integral to this re-articulation. The 
constitutive elements of class relations of FLMs are examined through the loss of roles 
associated with knowledge of tax issues, reflecting the transition of FLMs from experts 
contributing within the labour process to gatherers of statistics and monitors of the 
performance of others; the attempts by some FLMs to maintain discretion and older traditions 
RIZRUNDQGUHODWLRQVDQGWKHHIIHFWRIFKDQJHVRQ)/0V¶WUDGHXQLRQRULHQWDWLRQ 
 
From expertise and management to statistics and control 
 
Prior to tKHLQWURGXFWLRQRI/HDQ)/0V¶UROHVZHUHEURDGHUDQGOHVVDQWDJRQLVWLFWRZDUGV 
employees. Traditionally, FLMs were longstanding, experienced employees who had 
expertise in the substantive issues concerning taxation. They were constrained by a 
management structure and procedures, but still conceived themselves as managers, confident 
of their abilities, exercising discretion, having a degree of autonomy, and taking pride in their 
ZRUNDQGSHUIRUPDQFH)/0V¶RSSRVLWLRQWRWKHSDFNDJHRIPHDVXUHVDVVRFLDWHG with Lean 
showed few displays of nostalgia (Strangleman 1999). Nor did it have to respond to any 
narrative for change advanced by HMRC. Staff considered that changes were for the worse, 
and numerous concrete illustrations were forthcoming. Previously, for instance, knowledge of 
individuals in their sections was important, allowing FLMs to utilise different aptitudes: 
µDQ\ERG\JRRGDWSKRQHFDOOV,¶GJLYHWKHPWKHGLIILFXOWFDOOV¶ (branch secretary and former 
FLM, Site 5). Similarly, before Lean, supporting staff was a key aspect, and time was spent 
µFRDFKLQJDVVLVWLQJVWDIIDFWXDOO\GHDOLQJZLWKZRUN LVVXHVVWDIILVVXHVDQGEHLQJZKDW¶V
FODVVHGDVDQROGIDVKLRQHGPDQDJHU¶)/06LWH 
 
In contrast, under Lean, managers have substantially less control over their work as measured 
by perceived power to decide the pace and planning their work, when to take breaks and so 
on (Table 1). Questionnaire responses demonstrated that 85 per cent of FLMs considered that 
they had set their own pace of work pre-Lean quite a lot/a great deal, compared with only 23 
per cent post-Lean. The contrast was even greater for the ability to plan their work, with 
figures of 91 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively. 
 
The erosion of their autonomy proceeded alongside deskilling as their work became more 
prescribed and repetitive: pre-Lean, only 21 per cent of FLM respondents performed 
repetitive tasks quite a lot/a great deal, compared with 73 per cent post-Lean. The use of 
their expertise had been dramatically reduced, from 96 per cent using expertise quite a lot/a 
great deal before Lean to 55 per cent after implementation. There was a similar perceived 
decline in the use of their initiative and judgement. Deskilling and loss of control were 
therefore combined aspects of the same processes, manifested in the repetitive collection and 
collation of information and the production of large volumes of statistics that not only 
monitored the performance of teams, but also constrained their own ability to make 
judgements. The following sentiment was common: 
You have to follow the set Lean standards for day-to-GD\ZRUNLQJ«DVVRRQDV,
FRPHLQQRZ,KDYHWRILOOLQWKUHHVHWVRIFKDUWVRQP\RZQERDUG«JRWKURXJKDQG
ILOOLQP\PDQDJHU¶V ERDUGFRPHEDFNDQGE\WKDWWLPH,¶YHDOUHDG\SUREDEly about 
WKUHHKRXUV¶ZRUWKRIKRXUO\ VWDWVWRFROOHFW«ZKHUHDVEHIRUH,KDGREYLRXVO\
autonomy to use my own initiative. (FLM, Site 1) 
 
Table 1. The deskilling of staff work. 
     Pre Lean    Post Lean 
Quite a lot/a great deal  Quite a lot/a great deal 
%    %   
7RZKDWH[WHQWGLGGR\RX«  FLMs  Admin staff   FLMs    Admin staff 
Perform repetitive tasks   21  23    73  74 
Use initiative and judgement   81  78    23  10 
Use your expertise    96  95    55  34 
Deal with difficult problems   37  29    57  29 
Set your own pace of work   85  77    23  3 
Plan your work    91  81    15  3 
 
 
Table 2. Staff responses (%) on the causes of increased pressure. 
,QFUHDVHGSUHVVXUHZDVFDXVHGE\« 
 
A great deal/To some extent    Not much/Not at all 
     FLMs Admin   FLMs Admin   
Supervisory monitoring    54  80    22  6 
Individual targets     59  85    17  5 
Team targets     57  82    9  5 
Not enough time between tasks   62  73    18  9 
Insufficient information to do job   59  60    25  17 
Standard operational procedures   68  82    18  6 
Not enough time to talk    51  62    26  15 
Backlog of tasks     57  73    17  14 
 
)RUPHUDXWRQRP\LQFOXGHGKRZWRGHSOR\VWDIIµ<RXFDQ¶WGRWKDWXQGHU/HDQ 
(YHU\ERG\¶VVXSSRVHGWRGRWKHVDPH(YHU\ERG\¶VVXSSRVHGWREHWKHVDPHDQGas 
KXPDQEHLQJVZH¶UHQRW¶%UDQFK6HFUHWDU\6LWH 
 
The introduction of Lean signalled an attempt by higher management to tighten control of 
work processes. The system of collecting hourly output statistics, for instance, was designed 
to pressure FLMs to increase employee productivity, as indicated in this account: 
 
I send in what I reckon will be my available staff [for the following week] on a 
Wednesday«0\PDQDJHUZLOOWKHQVHQGLWEDFNWRPHEDVLFDOO\VKRZLQJZKDWWKH
planned production is for each SDUWLFXODUGD\«>EXW@LQSUDFWLFHLW¶VXQDFKLHYDEOH6R
HDFKGD\,¶PEDVLFDOO\IDLOLQJ SHUVRQDOO\WRPHHWP\WDUJHWV«,ZRXOGVD\HYHU\
single [FLM] in the office without fail, every day, does not achieve their targets, and 
then has to stand at half past eleven every day and justify ZK\\RXKDYHQ¶WPHWLW
(FLM, Site 1) 
 
These expectations of FLMs resulted in a rise in the reported levels of pressure: 86 per cent 
of FLMs reported feeling quite/very pressured after Lean, compared to only 29 per cent 
before its introduction. The main causes of this increase, as highlighted in Table 2, were 
identified as being the imposition of Standard Operating Procedures (68 per cent), and 
insufficient time between tasks (62 per cent). Other significant causes included individual and 
team targets. 
 
The impact of Lean increased the pressure on managers, an impact replicated and intensified 
on administrative workers, so that the number feeling quite/very pressured rose from 14 per 
cent pre-Lean to 95 per cent following implementation. The new roles forced upon FLMs 
were implicated in this increased pressure, with new interactions between FLMs and their 
teams perceived almost entirely negatively. Individual targets topped the stated causes of 
increased pressure, but 80 per cent of administrative staff cited additional pressure being 
caused a great deal/to some extent by the associated PRQLWRULQJRI)/0V,Q:RPDFNHWDO¶V
(1990) The Machine that Changed the World, one of the few comments made about the 
effects of Lean on workers was that they would find the work challenging and thus 
interesting. Where rhetoric met practice in HMRC, µFKDOOHQJLQJ¶EHFDPHQDUURZO\
LQWHUSUHWHGDVHQFRXUDJLQJ)/0VWRµFKDOOHQJH¶SRRU performance:  
 
7KHKRXUO\LQWHUYHQWLRQV«WDNHSODFHbut only if somebody was under-DFKLHYLQJ«
[FLMs] would have interaction with their staff, but only when there was a negative, 
never when there was a positive, or even just to build up a healthy working 
UHODWLRQVKLSRWKHUWKDQ,¶PWKHERVV DQG\RX¶OODQVZer to me. (FLM, Site 2) 
 
Notwithstanding that targets were frequently unachievable, FLMs were expected to ensure 
that they were met, and failure resulted in pressure on them that they in turn were expected to 
transfer to their team. 
 
Increased friction with employees 
 
/LWWOHZRQGHUWKHQWKHZRUNIRUFHVDZ/HDQDVHQFRXUDJLQJµEXOO\LQJDQGFRQWURORYHU VWDII¶
(AO, Site 5, questionnaire) resulting in much higher rates of disciplinary action instigated by 
Early Management Action (EMA) against individuals over issues such as performance, 
ZRUNLQJSDWWHUQVDQGDWWHQGDQFH2QH)/06LWHUHSRUWHGWKDWµWKH team next to me has got 
WKUHHRQ(0$RXWRIDWHDPRIQLQHRUWHQ¶$VDUHVXOWRIWKLV significant move towards a 
more disciplinary regime, those managed by FLMs now view them very differently: 
[Previously] managers knew you, your capabilities, your quality of work and shortcomings as 
well. Now they choose figures to enter onto a board and to persecute us with. They are no 
longer involved with tax work. (AO, Site 6, questionnaire) 
 
Increased friction is not restricted to the single issue of performance. Despite negotiated 
flexible working arrangements, at site level HMRC were attempting to curtail them as 
incompatible with Lean working (as advocated by Radnor and Bucci 2007): I had to speak to 
DJX\\HVWHUGD\EHFDXVHKHSXWRQKLVVKHHW«WKDWKHZDVJRLQJWRZRUNWLOO R¶FORFN+H
decided to go home at 4. He was pulled into the office the next day and was told he could 
well be subject to disciplinary proceedings. (FLM, Site 5) Increasingly, punitive action is also 
EHLQJWDNHQRYHUVLFNQHVVDQGDEVHQFH0DQDJHUV¶ discretion had been removed not so much 
by changes to the content of rules but by senior maQDJHPHQW¶VLQVLVWHQFHWKDW)/0V
responded in a standardised way when absences reached a particular number: 
 
,WZDV>WKHGHSDUWPHQWV¶@LQWHUSUHWDWLRQWKDW>)/0V@ZHUHPDNLQJH[FXVHVIRUQRW
operating the policy against individuals that they had good working relationships with 
because they were too IULHQGO\«6RWKHGULYHZDVWKHQµ7KHVHDUHWKHUXOHVWKLVLV
ZKDW\RX¶UHHPSOR\HGWRGRWKLV is what we expect you to do and over the next 12 to 
18 months your manager will be having your sickness absence records for your staff 
HYHU\PRQWKWRPDNHVXUH\RX¶UHGRLQJLW¶)/0 Site 2) 
 
The combined changes to the work of FLMs ± the routinisation, the collection of statistics 
and monitoring of performance ± has signalled a significant cultural shift in the organisation, 
HQYLVDJLQJWKDWPDQDJHUVGRLQJWKHLUMREµSURSHUO\¶VKRXOGQRORQJHUH[HUFLVH managerial 
discretion in dealings with employees. 
 
Resisting reforms and maintaining traditions 
 
The new management style required neither substantive knowledge nor confidence to 
make decisions:  
 
0DQDJHUV¶MXGJHPHQW«LVVRPHWKLQJWKDWGRHVQ¶WUHDOO\H[LVWDQ\PRUH«7KH\
want you tobe exactly the same as the next person in the next city in the next county 
as if everybody is managed exactly the same. (FLM, Site 2) 
 
The same standard operating procedures that govern tax handling under Lean have been 
applied to the supervision of tax labour. This restructuring of the roles of FLMs has taken its 
toll. They found themselves unable to influence implementation or to address problems 
within the workforce. Questionnaire responses from FLMs indicated that 72 per cent of 
manager respondents disagreed/strongly disagreed with the statement that Lean had made 
their jobs more interesting, and 74 per cent of managers agreed/strongly agreed that it had 
reduced their ability to manage with discretion. Only 16 per cent agreed/strongly agreed that 
they could influence the way Lean was implemented, and 53 per cent agreed/strongly agreed 
WKDWLWZDVQRZPRUHGLIILFXOWWRGHDOZLWKZRUNHUV¶LQGLYLGual problems. Managers felt 
relatively powerless and stressed by the expectations placed upon them. Many felt alienated 
from procedures, and did not identify with aspects of Lean. Fixing on the use of red signals, 
indicating that production was falling behind targets, one UHSRUWHGµ,W¶VDOZD\VLQUHGEHFDXVH
WKH\GRQ¶WGRLWULJKWEHFDXVHWKH\ZRUNRQWLPLQJV WKDWDUHWRRORZDQ\ZD\6RWKH\¶UH
QHYHUJRLQJWRJHWLWLQJUHHQDVORQJDVWKH\OLYH¶ (FLM, Site 4). 
 
Experienced FLMs regarded the prescriptive SROLFHVDURXQG/HDQDVµLQWHUIHUHQFHLQ 
WKHUROHRIWKH)/0¶)/06LWH7KHVHYLHZVKDYHUHSRUWHGO\QRWJRQHXQQRWLFHGE\ 
senior management: 
 
The department tells us, or the senior management in the department estimate, that 35 
per cent of their manageUVDUHµEH\RQGUHGHPSWLRQ¶7KH\UHFRJQLVHWKDWSHUFHQW
of their managers cannot do the job the way they want them to do it. (Branch 
Committee member, Site 3) 
 
,QDELOLW\WRGRWKHMREVWHPPHGQRWIURPVRPXFKIURPZHDNQHVVHVLQ)/0V¶WHFKQLFDO 
capabilities, but from their attitudes, with some active resistance to aspects of Lean 
and the new managerial regime: 
 
:HKDYH>PHHWLQJV@ZLWKP\+2>KLJKHURIILFHU@HYHU\GD\DQGWKH\¶UHVLWWLQJ
talking about an LQGLYLGXDO¶VSURGXFWLRQ,¶YHVWRSSHGLWVWUDLJKWDZD\EHFDXVHWKDW¶V
not supposed to be KDSSHQLQJEXWDJDLQ,¶PYLHZHGDVQHJDWLYHEHFDXVH,¶PQRW
taking part in an allegedly constructive discussion. (FLM, Site 1) 
 
Similarly, experienced managers took pride in their knowledge of tax work and were 
acutely aware of the causes of variations in performance and cycles of work that made 
nonsense of the demand for consistent achievement of hourly targets. This knowledge 
allowed them to question demands: 
 
If you could justify [failure to meet targets] then that in theory is the end of the matter. 
Providing your justification seems to be solid, then that would be fine. I would 
struggle to VHHKRZVRPHSHRSOHFRXOGMXVWLI\LWWKRXJKLIWKH\GRQ¶WXQGHUVWDQGWKH
ZRUN«WKHRQO\ WKLQJWKDW\RX¶YHJRWLVWKDt the computer says that this is what you 
should be achieving. (FLM, Site 2) 
 
Conflict between their personal assessments and the imperatives of their roles caused 
FLMs on occasions to adopt seemingly contradictory positions. One FLM was implementing 
Early Management Action for sickness absence while simultaneously providing union 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQIRUWKHPHPEHUµ,ZHQWWKURXJKWKHSURFHGXUHVEXWWKHQZHQWWR WKHERDUG¶V
PHGLFDOH[DPLQHUZLWKKLPDVKLVXQLRQUHSDQGDUJXHG«WKDWQRDFWLRQ VKRXOGEHWDNHQ¶ 
(FLM, Site 2). 
 
There was therefore evidence of resistance to the closer integration of FLMs into the function 
of capital, but this resistance had definite limits. First, and obviously, FLMs themselves were 
open to disciplinary action for poor performance if they stepped too far RXWRIOLQHµ7KHUH
ZRXOGKDYHEHHQDSURYLVRLQWKHUHEHIRUHDERXWGHPRWLRQEXW,¶YH never seen anyone 
demoted ± GLVPLVVHGRUWKH\¶YHEXFNHGWKHLULGHDVXS± QRERG\¶VHYHU EHHQGHPRWHG¶)/0
Site 2). By insisting on FLM action against staff, senior management consciously attempted 
to break the ties between FLMs and lower grade employees.The organisation redefined the 
relationship between FLMs and staff to make clear that: 
 
<RX¶UHQRWWKHLUIULHQG\RX¶UHWKHLUPDQDJHUDQGWKDW¶VZKDWZHSD\\RXWRGR«QRW
finding H[FXVHVIRUSHRSOH\RXDFWXDOO\KDSSHQWRJHWRQZLWK«6RLWPDGHLWDOHYHO
playing field, although that playing field had been reduced so far down that we were 
all playing well below sea level. (FLM Site 2) 
 
The second limitation was that resistance did not extend to all FLMs. The growing pressure 
on FLMs from those above was having an effect. FLMs were fearful that:  
 
,I,GRQ¶WGRWKLVVRPHERG\¶VJRLQJWREHFRPLQJDORQJWRFKHFNXSRQPHVR,¶G
EHWWHUGRLW¶ And gradually, piece-by-piece, their own personality basically is 
GLVDSSHDULQJEHFDXVH\RX¶YH got to come in and do what it tells you and look at the 
instructions and follow the instructions, DQGGRQ¶WUHDOO\WKLQNRXWVLGHWKDW)/06LWH
2) 
 
As another FLM indicated that FLMs are being alienated from their teams and drawn into 
FRQIOLFWµ6RPHRIWKHPDQDJHUVDUHFDXJKWLQWKHFOHIWQRZEHFDXVHWKHVWDIIDUH looking for 
WKHPWREHWKHEXIIHUDQGWKH\FDQ¶WEHWKHEXIIHUDQ\ORQJHUDQGWKDW becomes problematLF¶
(FLM, Site 1). 
 
Fear was not necessary for some to adopt the new ethos, however. At all sites, interviewees 
remarked on how the cultural change has seen the emergence of a new layer of managers, 
SDUWLFXODUO\DVµDORWRIWKHSHRSOHZKR«GLGQ¶WZDQWto experience the Lean existence, took 
WKHRSWLRQRIHDUO\UHWLUHPHQW¶)/06LWH6WDIIZLWKGLIIHUHQWDWWLWXGHV and backgrounds 
UHSODFHGH[SHULHQFHG)/0Vµ7KH\¶YHFRPHIURP&XVWRPV WKH\¶YHFRPHIURP7D[&UHGLWV
WKH\¶YHQHYHUGRQHWKHMREWKH\¶YHQever read a technical PHPR¶)/06LWH). In addition 
to the recruitment of managers from outside the old Inland Revenue tradition, the criteria for 
internal recruitment have also changed. Young staff have been promoted ± µ7KHUH¶VORWVDQG
lots of managers in their very early twenties who have only been in the department less than 
WZRWKUHH\HDUV«DVLWXDWLRQXQKHDUG RI\HDUVDJR¶)/06LWH,WLVQRWMXVWWKH
lack of experience to which existing FLMs objected, but that promotion required new 
managers to be enthusiasts for Lean initiatives. New managers were reportedly selected on 
the following criteria: Do you operate Lean as Lean should be operated? Are you a supporter 
of problem solving? Are you a supporter of this? Are you a supporter of that? Do you go to 
lots of meetings that take you away from your desk? (FLM, Site 2) 
 
Nor are these criteria for promotion restricted to lower managerial positions: 
 
We had members of staff who were seconded to the Lean team and trained up as 
consultants, and out of the 19 promotions or 20 promotions that we had to HO 
>+LJKHU2IILFHU@,¶GVD\ at least 15 of them were actually known as really big 
supporters of Lean. (Branch Committee member, Site 5) 
 
These developments have profoundly damaged the confidence of managers, their social 
relations and their attitudes towards the union. 
 
FLMs, the labour process and trade unionism 
 
7KHFKDQJHGEDODQFHZLWKLQ)/0V¶ZRUNDQGWKHJHQHUDWLRQDOVKLIWLQWKRVHSURPRWHG has 
potentially significant consequences for the culture of the workplace and, specifically, the 
ability of the union, PCS, to maintain membership and unity. Overall density of the union 
amongst the grades it represents is more than 80 per cent, and includes a high number of 
FLMs, including some who are trade-union representatives. That FLMs belonged to the union 
is not surprising. The majority were traditionally drawn from the AO grade that they 
supervised, their pay continued to be negotiated by the union, and the pay premium, although 
significant, changed insufficiently to explain on its own a fracturing of FLM interests.  
 
Management initiatives associated with Lean threaten to disrupt this settlement. Union 
opposition to Lean initially appeared antagonistic to the FLMs responsible for implementing 
it. )/0V¶UHVXOWLQJDPELYDOHQFHWRWKHXQLRQPRGHUDWHGVXEVHTXHQWO\DV they turned to it to 
represent them when experiencing difficulties with other members. One representative talked 
of FLMs asking: 
 
Can you represent me in this meeting? Because this person LVVD\LQJWKDW,¶PQRW 
LPSOHPHQWLQJWKHUXOHVSURSHUO\DQGWKDW,¶PKDYLQJDJRDWWKHPZKHQUHDOO\,¶P
just GRLQJP\MRE«WKH\PLJKWEHOLHYH\RXEHFDXVHWKH\¶UHQRWEHOLHYLQJPH
(laughing). (FLM representative, Site 2) 
 
Not all implementation of Lean was as consciously even-handed, in part because, as the 
managerial regime hardened, union-orientated FLMs found themselves isolated within 
management ranks: 
 
:HKDGDFDVH«WDQWDPRXQWWREXOO\LQJIRUDPDQDJHPHQWJUDGHZKRGRHVQ¶WWRHWKH
party line on the Lean front, who actually wants to use their own common-sense and 
run a team VHQVLEO\EHLQJPDGHWRIHHOYHU\EDG7KH\¶UHUHDOO\RVWUDFised. (Branch 
Committee member, Site 5) 
 
As a result of senior management attitudes, many FLMs were unwilling to enter into conflict 
with peers and senior managers, and appear much closer to the ideal-typical post-Lean 
manager, concerned with targets, monitoring and discipline (Figure 1), that the changes were 
designed to create. The effects of this attempted transformation are uneven, but were 
particularly pronounced in the case of new FLMs. Their lack of experience and the fact that 
their training was minimal coloured relations with those they supervised. One manager 
stated: 
 
I still feel that you cannot manage a task unOHVV\RXDFWXDOO\XQGHUVWDQGWKHWDVN,W¶V
no use me VD\LQJWKDWWKLVLVDQDFKLHYDEOHWDUJHWXQOHVV,¶PZLOOLQJWRVLWGRZQDQG
show you that it is, DQGLI,FDQ¶WVLWGRZQDQGGRWKDWWKHQ,WKLQN\RXORVHDELWRI
FUHGLELOLW\ZLWKWKHVWDII\RX¶UHPDQDging. (FLM, Site 2) 
 
7KLVHYDOXDWLRQLVERUQHRXWE\WKHSHUFHSWLRQVRIWKRVHVXSHUYLVHGµ+RZFDQWKH\ tell me 
KRZ,¶PJRLQJZURQJLQP\MREZKHQWKH\GRQ¶WNQRZKRZWRGRWKHMREWKHPVHOYHV¶ (Focus 
Group member, Site 5). The lack of substantive knowledge of work being supervised places 
managers in an invidious position, reducing them to invoking, and mechanically following, 
procedures even where they are inappropriate. One FLM expressed the resulting attitude as: 
µ<RX¶UHJRLQJWRUHVSHFWPHEHFDXVH,¶PJRing to LPSOHPHQWWKHVHUXOHV,¶YHQRWKLQJHOVHWR
KLGHEHKLQGVR,ZLOOKLGHEHKLQGWKHVH¶ (FLM, Site 2). The failure to defend teams against 
excessive demands in turn lowered FRRSHUDWLRQDQGH[DFHUEDWHGWHDPV¶GLVLOOXVLRQPHQWDQG
hostility. The cycle of distrust LQFUHDVHG)/0V¶UHOLDQFHRQWKHGHOHJDWHGDXWKRULW\IURP
higher management, and as a FRQVHTXHQFHLQRQHPDQDJHU¶VMXGJHPHQWµ7KH\MXVWGRDV
WKH\¶UHWROG¶)/06LWH 
 
At separate sites, those supervised by the new generation of FLMs caricatured many of them 
DVµ/HDQ]HDORWV¶DQGµ/HDQURERWV¶ 7KHHURVLRQRIPDQDJHUV¶LQGHSHQGHQFHVXEVWDntive 
knowledge and confidence, and the growing hostility and friction with their teams, have 
significant implications for the trade-union orientation of the new breed of FLMs. Without 
the respect of their teams, and increasingly dependent on positional authority, they are 
unlikely to contradict higher management or be amongst those retaining membership and 
requesting help from the union: 
 
An increasing numbeURIPDQDJHUV«DUHPRYLQJDZD\IURP3&6DVDSRLQWRIVXSSRUWDQG 
RQFHWKH\ORVHWKHVXSSRUWHOHPHQWRIWKHXQLRQWKHQWKHUHLVQ¶WDJUHDWGHDOOHIWEHFDXVH
WKH\¶OO JHWWKH>XQLRQQHJRWLDWHG@SD\ULVHV«\RXPD\DVZHOOVDYH\RXUPRQH\)/06LWH
2) Earlier work on white-collar trade unionism noted the different preoccupations from 
manual trade unionism of some groups and located the causes as being related to social class 
at the workplace (Carter 1985). Within the present context at HMRC, it is not difficult to 
envisage pressure for separate FLM organisation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The changes associated with Lean have assumed particular prominence within HMRC, and 
the organisation has been used to champion similar ones throughout the Civil Service and 
beyond. The significance of the analysis here, therefore, goes beyond one government 
department. Lean brought with it a marked change in the work of FLMs as the balance of 
their tasks moved from support and advice towards greater supervision and monitoring. 
Earlier studies on front-line managers stressed the long-term diminution of their powers as 
managerial hierarchies were extended. In reaction to this perspective, Rose et al. maintained 
that while some aspects of their traditional role had been lost, they still held on to task 
allocation and decisions about pace and intensity of ZRUNXQHTXLYRFDOO\FRQFOXGLQJµ)LUVW-
line supervisors under advanced capitalism are neither rendered progressively less powerful 
QRUOHVVDXWKRULWDWLYH¶7KLVFRQFOXVLRQ has not been borne out in HMRC, where 
all these powers have been removed and, although some power over labour has superficially 
increased, it is less independent and more clearly subject to control from above. Nor has 
+DVVDUGHWDO¶VFRQWHQWLRQ that there have been massive increases in the scope and 
scale of their managerial roles been substantiated. Under Lean, they have less discretion and 
utilise fewer skills, with their roles neither having, nor requiring, substantive knowledge of 
taxation issues.The widespread introduction of targets under the auspices of Lean has resulted 
in reconfiguring the roles of supervision, disciplining their practice, weakening their ties 
with labour, and sharpening conflict. Changes in the labour process represented an attempt to 
tie FLM roles more tightly to the interests of the state as employer, with a number of 
consequences for their social relations at work. As FLMs performed less direct tax work and, 
LQ0DU[¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQSURJUHVVLYHO\OHVVZRUNRIFRRUGLQDWLRQ and unification, their 
social and economic roles moved from contributing within the labour process, as part of 
collective labour, to non-labour. Procedural changes increasingly required them to perform 
tasks associated with the function of capital, namely supervision and control designed to 
extract more surplus from those under their immediate control. 
 
Figure 1. Ideal-typical manager, Pre- and Post-lean. 
 
Pre-Lean       Post-Lean 
Advise and support      Monitor and discipline 
Allocate tasks and workload     Allocate targets 
Knowledge of tax and work process  Knowledge of Lean and procedures 
Responsibility for achieving expected norms  Adherence to targets 
Discretion       Standard Operating Procedures  
Union member      Inactive or non-member 
Involved in collective labour process  Functions for capital 
 
7KHVHSURFHVVHVYDOLGDWH&DUFKHGL¶VSHUVSHFWLYHV7KHIDFWWKDWWKHUHDUHIHZDXWKRUV 
applying them empirically is more to do with theoretical disagreement than the impossibility 
of so doing. Nor does conceptualising class through social roles in production leads to an 
LQHYLWDEOHHPEUDFHZLWKDµVWHULOHIXQFWLRQDOLVWSURMHFW¶6PLWKDQG7KRPSVRQ 1999). The 
transformation of the work of FLMs was neither even nor automatic, and has been met with 
varying responses, from opposition to opportunistic identification. Experienced FLMs, with 
confidence in their knowledge of both substantive issues and the processes and rhythms of 
tax collection, have not accepted hourly targets as legitimate, and have been reluctant to place 
unfair pressure on the staff beneath them. 
 
Similarly, in the face of mandatory reporting of absences and action taken to curtail them, 
they have done their best to mitigate the effects of procedures and to retain some exercise of 
judgement. Other FLMs reluctantly complied with the imposition of Lean, aware that they 
themselves were now exposed and subject to performance monitoring. A third response, from 
a group largely comprising younger, inexperienced FLMs, embraced Lean, volunteered for 
problem-solving events, accepted its mantras, and have been rewarded by rapid promotion. 
Some FLM discontent with Lean was evident, but discontent was amplified in the wider 
workforce suffering from work intensification and greater levels of stress and illness ± 
outcomes closely related to the changed nature of supervision. The concerted attempt to 
detach FLMs from the rest of the workforce and to transform them into unambiguous agents 
of higher management through enforcing their monitoring and supervisory roles has 
generated more antagonistic social relations with their teams. FLMs traditionally came from 
the groups they subsequently supervised, and brought with them understanding of the work, 
sympathy with workers and common union membership. Union membership was 
underpinned by these histories, and the now different routes into management risk making 
union membership if not untenable,then at least unlikely. The new roles primarily consist of 
the function of capital, and with )/0V¶UROHLQWKHODERXUSURFHVVZHDNHQed and confidence 
eroded, it is difficult to envisage the bases of effective union action. 
 
These developments give rise to a paradox. In most class schemas, from Weber (1958) 
through to those influenced by Bourdieu (1986), non-economic capitals, skills, specialist 
knowledge and discretion are markers for membership of the middle class, and the loss 
of these features signals a proletarianisation process. In contra-distinction, using Carchedian 
perspectives, the experiences of FLMs in HMRC highlight both a de-skilling and a significant 
removal from the labour process, strengthening functions on behalf of capital and thus further 
incorporation into a new middle class. By so characterising this movement, the analysis 
connects their roles in the generation of surplus with their changing interests and identities. 
There are problems and contradictions in these developments. It is far from clear, for 
example, that any of the supposed productivity benefits claimed are real or realisable (Carter 
et al. 2013a), and the removal of skill and initiative from FLMs will not help in this regard. 
Nevertheless, in so far as concerted and effective workplace organisation, and wider social 
opposition, to government and HPSOR\HURIIHQVLYHVDUHDEVHQW%ULWDLQ¶VSHULRGRIDXVWHULWy 
and employment loss may well encourage similar experiences, with class relations changing 
and polarising at the point of production, and processes escaping scrutiny as the sociology of 
class absents itself from the workplace. 
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